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1. Introduction
Global problems such as poverty, migration and climate change require interdisciplinary inquiry
and solutions. In recognition of this need, interdisciplinary approaches are beginning to be
privileged in research funding policies and decisions, and in pedagogies favouring problem-based
and experiential learning. It is timely, then, to focus attention, as this paper does, on the reasoning
involved in interdisciplinary inquiry and on what can be done to facilitate and nurture successful
interdisciplinary inquiry.
As the author describes it, interdisciplinary inquiry will usually involve the integration of
information from a, possibly diverse, range of disciplines to generate alternative explanations
followed by the determination of which of those explanations is the best one. Thus, a principal
reasoning move in interdisciplinary inquiry is inference to the best explanation. Making those
inferences presents a particular challenge given that each disciplinary inquirer will bring a different
perspective to the inquiry, contribute different types of data gathered via different means and
measured and evaluated according to different scales and standards. The author draws on her own
involvement in interdisciplinary projects to provide two case studies of interdisciplinary inquiry
in action. The paper is very relevant given the extent to which real-world inquiry needs to be
interdisciplinary, and I found it interesting and thought-provoking. In the main, my comments are
intended to suggest elements of the paper that seem ripe for further expansion or give rise to further
questions for reflection and investigation.
2. Not just the best explanation
The author identifies inferences to the best explanation (hereafter IBE) as the main reasoning task
of interdisciplinary inquiry. Yet, as she notes in her discussion of her second case study, the
assumption that any one of the explanations proffered from the perspective of a diverse group of
disciplines could be the best of the bunch is unhelpful to the inquiry for it drives us back to a monodisciplinary approach. Instead, her own approach was to integrate the various explanatory
narratives into a single narrative that offered a holistic explanation of the rigid division of
information and collaboration between forestry and agriculture experts. This example
demonstrates how it is possible to come to an explanation that enables us better to understand the
problem at hand. However, once we have gained an understanding of a problem, our inquiry,
including, perhaps, especially, interdisciplinary inquiry, also aims to offer solutions to that
problem. Take for example the practice of making a medical diagnosis and then arriving at a
treatment decision. The reasoning involved in coming to diagnoses consists primarily of IBE
drawn from a variety of data including the patient’s symptoms, various tests such as blood tests,
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ultrasound scans, CAT scans, cardiograms, and so on. Just this wide variety of tests and their
related measures and standards demonstrates the way in which medical diagnoses are often
interdisciplinary inquiries. Arriving at a correct diagnosis of a patient’s condition will often require
the input of more than one physician in order to conclude which interventions will offer the best
approach to curing or managing the patient’s condition. In the case of a cancer diagnosis, for
example, the inquiry and resultant solution may well involve (at least) a surgeon, a radiologist and
an oncologist working in concert to offer a complete treatment plan. In the medicine case the
members of the community of inquiry first bring relevant concepts, methods, measures and
standards to bear to reach an explanation of the patient’s symptoms that weaves the strands of their
individual explanations into a single account or story of what’s going on with the patient. On the
basis of that interdisciplinary account, they move forward to find an interdisciplinary solution that
enables them each to bring to bear their expertise in the best interests of the patient. While there
are no doubt moments of disagreement and contest in communities of inquiry in the medical
profession, they do, it seems to me, offer a potentially rich source of both case studies and sites for
further investigation and reflection on interdisciplinary inquiry and problem-solving. Moreover,
these communities of inquiry may well employ inquiry tools that could be deployed more widely
in interdisciplinary inquiry.
The medicine example also illustrates the way in which successful interdisciplinary inquiry
and problem solving brings together partial explanations into a productive whole. Each inquirer in
the community views the problem at hand through a lens particular to their discipline. Their lens
enables them to pick out features of the situation that are salient from within the conceptual and
methodological framework of that discipline. They interpret data, make measurements and apply
standards all from within that framework. Thus each individual’s inquiry, as the author notes, is
partial. It is partial in two respects. It is not impartial, it comes from within a particular framework
and an inquirer will feel naturally inclined towards, at home within, the narrative generated from
within the horizons of her own disciplinary outlook. But it is also partial in the sense that it tells
us only part of the complete story about what’s going on in the case at hand. By bringing together
each of these partial stories and creating a closer-to-complete story, we arrive at a better
explanation than we are likely to have had we confronted the problem at hand from a single
disciplinary perspective.
In discussing her own solution to the problem of combining diverse explanatory narratives
to generate a single, more complete, explanation, the author mentions (i) storytelling as a form of
argument and (ii) a ‘story with an argument.’ It wasn’t clear to me whether she was distinguishing
these, but nevertheless, the questions of the relation between narrative and argument and the role
that narrative might play in argument within an interdisciplinary (indeed, any) community of
inquiry are intriguing ones that invite further reflection, discussion and investigation.
3. Bias
The author notes that the risk of bias is bigger in interdisciplinary contexts. She provides a
discussion of various biases that can occur in the context of interdisciplinary inquiry – biased
choices of which process(s) to test, biased choices of which process counts as the best explanation
– as well as familiar cognitive biases such as convenience bias and confirmation bias. I wondered
whether, when biased reasoning occurs, it tends to manifest as bias in favour of the meanings,
measures and standards of one’s own discipline. On the face of it, in the case of confirmation bias,
that seems likely since, faced with reasoning through an array of methodological choices, inquirers
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are more likely to err on the side of the expected rather than the unexpected and an inquirer’s
expectations will be embedded in her discipline. In the case of convenience bias, however, it
seems less likely (though not necessarily unlikely) that an inquirer will err towards her own
discipline if the explanation offered by another discipline presents an easier choice, or, as the
author describes, she is simply facing investigation-fatigue. While the danger of bias is clear and
present, it may be that bias is easier to detect and deal with in disciplinarily-diverse communities
of inquiry. When an inquiry is interdisciplinary, differences in the concepts, methodologies,
measures and standards of each discipline are more likely to be thrown into relief and to be foregrounded and negotiated than they are in the case of single disciplinary inquiries in which we can
remain blinkered to the frameworks in which we are operating. So while bias remains a danger, I
suggest the fact that within interdisciplinary inquiry the conceptual and methodological markers
of each discipline are on the surface means that it becomes easier to identify and negotiate bias.
4. Bridging the communication-reasoning gap
My penultimate points concern what the author describes as a gap between reasoning and
communication, together with her claim that group discussion can mitigate biases. I suggest that a
virtues-oriented approach to good inquiry may offer a productive means to bridging that gap. A
virtues oriented approach to inquiry takes an agent-centred turn, making what constitutes good
inquiry a matter, or partly a matter, of whether inquirers manifest certain characteristics.1 These
virtues include reliabilist virtues such as perceptual abilities, observational skills and the ability to
reason deductively and inductively; and responsibilist virtues such as open-mindedness, fairness,
epistemic humility, perseverance, the ability to recognise reliable authority, intellectual courage
and autonomy.2 A number of the responsibilist virtues are particularly relevant to the types of
group inquiry that occur in the context of interdisciplinary communities of practice. Striving to be
open-minded can help inquirers to remain open to explanations they had not previously thought of
even when they are at odds with explanations generated with their own discipline. By remaining
open to possibilities other than those to which she is already committed, the open-minded inquirer
can thus be less prone to bias in favour of her own discipline. The inquirer who strives to be
epistemically humble will avoid assuming that her own discipline is in some way superior to those
of other enquirers and be open to learning from and working alongside, or within, those other
disciplines. The inquirer who is diligent and prepared to persevere in her inquiries is less likely to
fall prey to convenience bias. The inquirer who possesses and displays intellectual courage will be
well placed to negotiate value choices and to take on board better explanations from disciplines
other than her own even when it means putting her own explanations to one side. While I have
only provided a brief sketch of the role that a virtues-oriented approach to good inquiry might play
in thinking further about effective interdisciplinary inquiry, it is, I think, sufficient to demonstrate
that there is rich potential in this approach with respect to confronting both the reasoning and
communication challenges in interdisciplinary inquiry. For it is an approach, an advantage of
which is that it enables us to focus and reflect upon relations between inquirers qua inquirers.
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The list of responsibilist virtues is drawn from (Zagzebski p. 114)
For examples of the virtue-theoretic approach to argument see, (Aberdein 2010, 2014); (Battaly 2010); (Paglieri
2014). For an example of an approach that see a role for virtue in accounts of good reasoning but not as constitutive
of good argument see (Bowell & Kingsbury 2013); 2105).
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5. Conclusion
Interdisciplinary work takes place not only at the intersections of disciplines, but also in the
interstices, in the often as yet unnamed spaces between disciplines, from which new sites of inquiry
and research questions arise. This sets us further challenges beyond understanding and negotiating
the interplay of diverse interdisciplinary voices. It requires us to inquire into newly created
disciplinary spaces requiring the negotiation of their own concepts, methods, measures and
standards.
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